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This thesis evaluates the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and provides 
an analysis of the impact this conflict has in Afghanistan. It examines why India and 
Pakistan maintain respective claims over Kashmir, and discusses the problem the United 
States faces in Afghanistan because of the extension of Indo-Pak rivalry into the Afghan 
conflict. The thesis analyses the regional rivalry through the lens of offensive realism and 
explains the impact of regional terrorism that has spawned primarily because of 
perpetuation of the conflict over Kashmir. The thesis concludes that lasting solution to 
the Kashmir conflict will allow both India and Pakistan to redeploy valuable diplomatic 
and military resources elsewhere in the region. This will then enable India and Pakistan 
to assist the stabilization of Afghanistan on a unified front. The U.S. will not be able to 
achieve a lasting peace in Afghanistan without the unilateral support of Pakistan and 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. KASHMIR: THE KEY TO PEACE IN SOUTH ASIA ...........................................1 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION................................................................1 
B. IMPORTANCE ................................................................................................1 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES ...............................................................1 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................4 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES .........................................................................9 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW ...................................................................................10 
II. PAKISTAN AND INDIA’S CLAIMS TO KASHMIR...........................................11 
A. RELIGIOUS CLAIM ....................................................................................12 
B. PAKISTAN’S ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM .............................................14 
C. STRATEGIC CLAIM ...................................................................................18 
D. INDIA’S CLAIM TO KASHMIR ................................................................21 
E. STRATEGIC ..................................................................................................22 
F. IDENTITY ......................................................................................................26 
G. SOVEREIGNTY ............................................................................................28 
H. TERRORISM AND COLLATERAL DAMAGE .......................................30 
III. KASHMIR’S IMPACT TO UNITED STATES IN AFGHANISTAN..................35 
A. TERRORIST SAFE HAVENS .....................................................................36 
B. FUTURE SECURITY OF AFGHANISTAN ..............................................40 
C. U.S. / INDIA ROLE IN SOUTH ASIA ........................................................43 
IV. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................47 
APPENDIX .............................................................................................................................49 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................51 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Map of Jammu and Kashmir (From CIA maps) ..............................................49 
 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 xi 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
9/11  Terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 
 
ISI  Pakistan, Inter-Service Intelligence 
 
LoC  Line of Control 
 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
 
TTP  Tehrike-e-Taliban 
 
UN  United Nations 
  
 xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1 
I. KASHMIR: THE KEY TO PEACE IN SOUTH ASIA 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to show how the lack of stability in 
Afghanistan is uniquely tied to the conflict in Kashmir. One of the most crucial issues 
facing the United States is how to bring about peace and stability in Afghanistan. Yet, 
two of its primary allies in the region are involved in an ongoing battle. The Kashmir 
conflict is an important component of a resource battle between India and Pakistan, 
which is often disguised as an ethnic or a religious war. Therefore, this thesis examines 
the impact of the ongoing conflict in Kashmir between India and Pakistan and its 
collateral effects on U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. Is instability in Afghanistan 
connected to the conflict in Kashmir?  
B. IMPORTANCE  
The war in Afghanistan is the longest war the U.S. has ever fought. As the U.S. 
winds down its war efforts in Afghanistan, it hopes to secure a functioning government 
with sufficient resources to dry up terrorist safe-havens. President Obama remarked that 
one of the single greatest threats to the U.S. is terrorist safe havens along the border 
region of Pakistan and Afghanistan.1  Critical U.S. interests in the region are to ensure a 
radical takeover of the Afghanistan government by extremist and other irregular forces 
does not happen. While there are several factors that influence instability in Afghanistan, 
this thesis explores hypothesis that the Kashmir conflict shapes the actions of Pakistan 
and India in Afghanistan that could undermine U.S. objectives in Afghanistan. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Both India and Pakistan use Afghanistan to further their offensive realism goals 
against the other, which may be undermining U.S. interests there. According to Synder, 
“realism’s” core is the belief that international affairs are a struggle for power among 
                                                 
1 Graham Usher, “The Afghan Triangle, Kashmir, India, Pakistan,” Middle East Report, Summer 
2009, 21. 
 2 
self-interested states. 2  Graham Usher points out Pakistan has used Afghanistan as a 
staging area for proxy soldiers to wage war in Kashmir and now shelters Taliban 
leadership in tribal area safe havens.3  He notes that India is engaged in several 
infrastructure projects to build up Afghanistan in an effort to dry up terrorist safe havens 
as well as to dominate Central Asian trade routes.4  The more India tries to build up 
Afghanistan, the more concerns Pakistan has of India opening up a second front along its 
western border. This security competition between these two regional powers is a classic 
case of offensive realism at work. The implications for the U.S. are that a delicate foreign 
policy with Pakistan and India must be crafted. If the U.S. can apply dual-sided pressure 
on India and Pakistan to resolve their Kashmir dispute, this will free up resources that 
each side can use to provide greater security and stability to the South Asia region. 
For the U.S., Pakistan is the key ally in Afghanistan. The U.S. is severely 
disadvantaged in Afghanistan because Afghanistan is a land locked country and far from 
U.S. supply bases. Pakistan is the logistics hub for U.S. troops and without its support, 
supplies for U.S. troops would be endangered. Additionally, Pakistan’s weakened 
western border with Afghanistan is vulnerable, allowing insurgents passage to safe 
havens in the tribal areas.5   The U.S. can benefit by the Pakistani military’s efforts in 
patrolling its western border and shutting down insurgent safe havens. 
Despite the importance of the western border for the U.S., Pakistan’s primary 
security focus is along its eastern border with India, because it considers India as its main 
threat.6  Pakistani forces along the eastern border number two to one with twice the troop 
strength that is facing Afghanistan.7  This division in troops is due to a strategic struggle 
over Kashmir that Pakistan is engaged in with India. The quest for control over Kashmir 
                                                 
2 Jack Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” Foreign Policy, December 2004, 3. 
3 Usher, “The Afghan Triangle,” 21. 
4 Ibid., 26.  
5 Bruce Riedel, “Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the Storm,” American Academy of  Political and 
Social Science, July 2008, 38. 
6 Usher, “Afghan Triangle,” 21. 
7 Ibid., 21. 
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causes Pakistan to unevenly divide its forces between east and west borders. How this is 
affecting Pakistan’s ability to control the Afghan border is important to understand. 
For the U.S., better border security on Pakistan’s western border is an important 
component of attaining security in Afghanistan. However, this objective may be 
inconsistent with Pakistan’s security priorities, which are driven by its hostile relationship 
with India. Moreover, this may be advantageous for Pakistan to allow greater 
vulnerability on its western border. In the past, it has used the region as a safe haven for 
its proxy soldiers and even funded training camps in the border region.8   
India plays a significant role as a U.S. ally as well. India, with its vast population, 
is a key trading partner of immense economic value. India is also a de facto nuclear state 
that has not signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. This gives the U.S. reason for 
pause and to apply a foreign policy toward India that keeps them on good terms with the 
U.S. India also is an ally in the war in Afghanistan by funding infrastructure and 
supporting the Karzai government. Yet, its relations with Pakistan are highly problematic 
and Kashmir appears to be at the center of that relationship. Recent relations between 
India and Pakistan since the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks have begun to thaw with both 
sides talking about strengthening relationships and increasing trade. However, India and 
Pakistan have taken casualties from skirmishes along the Line of Control (LoC) in 
Kashmir that have heated up in 2013.9  This is evidence of the sensitivities between these 
two states that even trying to normalize relations at a crawling pace may be too fast. The 
LoC standoff will continue to be a charged issue into the future as long as an acceptable 
peace to both sides remains elusive. 
Afghanistan ought to be understood as the other battleground, which bring us 
back to the problem the U.S. faces. India and Pakistan have carried their offensive 
realism strategy into Afghanistan. This thesis will examine whether U.S. objectives in 
Afghanistan are difficult to achieve due to the relationship between its two main allies in 
                                                 
8 Ryan Clarke, “Lashkar-I-Taiba: The Fallacy of Subservient Proxies and the Future of Islamist 
Terrorism in India,” L’Etort Papers (U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA 
2010), 12. 
9 “Pakistan accuses India of ‘warmongering’ over deadly LoC clashes,” Hindustan Times, January 16, 
2013. 
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the region. By easing the tensions between the Indo-Pak rivalry over Kashmir the U.S. 
will gain cooperative partners in their mission of achieving a lasting peace in 
Afghanistan. 
Hypothesis:  This thesis research will reveal that the competition between India 
and Pakistan over the territory of Kashmir is an impediment to the United States, Global 
War on Terror (GWOT) in Afghanistan. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains a 
roadblock to peace in Afghanistan because these two powers are engaged in a security 
competition that contains collateral damage that destabilizes Afghanistan. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The thesis will draw upon literature from a variety of disciplines. Starting from 
theoretical school of  “realist” international relations, which will be the best way to 
illustrate the competition between the two countries to specific literature on the U.S. 
interest and objectives in the region. Literature on Pakistan and India’s interest in 
Afghanistan and their dispute over Kashmir will also be explored. The thesis will 
establish a link between the two issues, which continue to be treated as separate entities. 
The conflict in Kashmir is a central theme to the strategic struggle between India and 
Pakistan. Mearsheimer’s theory of “offensive realism” explains the context of the 
Kashmir conflict. India and Pakistan are engaged in a security competition against each 
other. They seek to gain power at the expense of the other and look for opportunities 
where the benefits outweigh the costs.10  India and Pakistan building nuclear weapons, 
meddling in Afghanistan and fighting each other for control of Kashmir fits the theory of 
offensive realism. 
The realism framework fits best in describing the Kashmir conflict because of the 
security competition. Both countries see the accession of Kashmir to their state as being a 
boost to their state’s power. India and Pakistan have fought three wars over the territory 
of Kashmir. They have developed nuclear weapons as a means of increasing their relative 
power. The primary method of control for Kashmir is through the use of armed power. 
                                                 
10 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton Company, 
2001), 21. 
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India has deployed a substantial occupational force to Kashmir and Pakistan continues 
military conflict through the use of proxy soldiers. Using diplomacy or social groups to 
further a solution is a secondary process to maintaining military power. 
Scholars such as Ganguly and Kapur have specifically applied the realism 
framework to the India-Pakistan rivalry in South Asia. Kapur says that after Pakistan was 
defeated in the 1971 war with India, Kashmir entered a period of peace. Pakistan had lost 
the military power to challenge India. It was not until Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons 
that the Kashmir conflict heated up again. Emboldened with the security deterrent that 
nuclear weapons provide, Pakistan was confident that it could reassert its military effort 
in Kashmir without the fear of stiff Indian reprisals.11  Sumit Ganguly agrees stating that 
after Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons it was free to pursue sub-conventional warfare 
against India and be safe from Indian retaliation.12  
As a counterpoint, Peter Lavoy writes that states can still fight conventional wars 
even while possessing nuclear weapons. Indian and Pakistan proved this in the Kargil war 
and in the 2001–2002 standoff. Pakistani planners were not concerned about the risk of 
Indian nuclear retaliation. Both sides did not ready their nuclear arsenals during these 
conflicts. Other factors such as terrain and the military balance in Kashmir emboldened 
Pakistan to advance across the LoC, not nuclear weapons. Lavoy concludes that it is a 
lack of nuclear learning between India and Pakistan that pushes them to conflicts despite 
possessing nuclear weapons.13  During the Cuban Missile Crisis the U.S. had to learn 
similar lessons in the early years of it gaining nuclear weapons. 
Victoria Schofield and Praveen Swami reinforce the relevance of the offensive 
realism framework. Schofield demonstrates that India and Pakistan seized any 
opportunity to destabilize the other. India wants to keep dismembering Pakistan as it did 
with creation of Bangladesh and Pakistan looks for opportunity to create instability 
                                                 
11 Paul Kapur, “Peace and Conflict in the Indo-Pakistani Rivalry: Domestic and Strategic Causes,” in 
Sumit Gangulay and William R. Thompson, eds., Asian Rivalries:  Conflict Escalation, and Limitations on 
Two-Level Games (Stanford University Press, 2011), 63. 
12 Praveen Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad (London: Routledge, 2007), 204. 
13 Peter Lavoy, Asymmetric Warefare in South Asia:  the causes and consequences of the Kargil 
Conflcit (Cambridge University Press, New York: 2009), 12. 
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within Indian borders.14  Swami furthers Schofield’s work by saying Pakistan has the 
ability to escalate warfare in Kashmir to unprecedented levels.15  The efforts both 
countries put into destabilizing the other fits the definition of a strategic security 
competition. 
There is also literature on Afghanistan and the influences Pakistan and India are 
putting to work there. Afghanistan is a new front in the continuing effort India and 
Pakistan put into destabilize the other. Graham Usher discusses how India and Pakistan 
use Afghanistan to further their strategic goals. India has invested $1.2 billion into a 
Muslim country building roads, government buildings, running utilities and supporting 
the Karzai government.16  This is a lot of effort for India to support a country in which it 
does not even share a border. By contrast Pakistan believes its best foreign policy 
interests are finding a government that can bring stability to Afghanistan and one that will 
support Pakistani interests and this includes negotiations with the Taliban.17  India and 
Pakistan’s foreign policy toward Afghanistan can only be explained through the lens of 
realism framework as each country looks for avenues to destabilize and control the other.  
The U.S. interest in the region is producing a stable Afghanistan government that 
can hold off the Taliban and prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a safe haven for 
terrorists.18  The U.S. strategy complements the strategy of India, but does not work well 
for Pakistan. Pakistan needs the terrorist safe havens to support the proxy war against 
India. There is a vast amount of literature that documents Pakistan’s support for terrorist 
safe havens. Daniel Byman points out that Pakistan is a state sponsor of terrorism.19 
Balraj Puri draws connections in the way Pakistan harbors terrorists who operate in 
                                                 
14 Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict (London:  I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2000), 228. 
15 Swami, “India and The Secret Jihad,” 195. 
16 Usher, “Afghan Triangle,” 26. 
17 Ibid., 26. 
18 Ibid., 21. 
19 Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections:  States that Sponsor Terrorism (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 56. 
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Kashmir and before 9/11 Afghanistan harbored Bin Laden.20  Exploring this strategy 
mismatch will be a component to the thesis.  
Pakistan and India’s strategic goals in Kashmir have far reaching effects. Pakistan 
has areas of good governance and at the same time encourages policies that pose a threat 
for the international community and its own survival.21  Pakistan sees the Kashmir 
territory as one of the main issues in its relations with India.22  It therefore can behave 
irrationally to achieve its strategic goals even if it costs internal destabilization and 
radicalization of society. India is as strongly committed to holding Kashmir just as much 
as Pakistan is committed to taking it from them.23 There is sufficient information 
available that discusses this conflict. Books and journals offer insight into the politics 
between the countries and the forces that drive them to continue the Kashmir issue. The 
Pakistani newspaper The Dawn reported on the costs the Pakistani army incurs in 
deploying army assets to the Kashmir region. The costs were highlighted after a deadly 
avalanche killed many Pakistani soldiers stationed along the LoC.24  
The use of terrorism by Pakistan is a central theme that creates the instability in 
Afghanistan. Literature discusses the challenges Pakistan has in dealing with the terrorists 
and supporting U.S. policy in the region. According to the Pakistan Ambassador to the 
U.S., before 9/11 Pakistan had one suicide bombing in 2001 and 300 since 9/11.25  This 
is one example of the costs Pakistan has paid in supporting U.S. policy. Literature is also 
critical of Pakistan’s policy of supporting terrorist safe-havens. The Pakistan army has 
reluctantly acted against the terrorist insurgents, but only after they have posed direct 
threats to their government’s power base.26  Graham Usher has pointed out that letting 
                                                 
20 Balraj Puri, “India, Kashmir and War against Terrorism,” Economic and Political  Weekly, 
November 2001, 4043. 
21 Farzana Shaikh, Making Sense of Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 1. 
22 Kapur, “Peace and Conflict in the Indo-Pakistani Rivalry,” 66. 
23 Ibid., 70. 
24 “Kayani urges less spending on defense,” The Dawn, April 19, 2012. 
25 Sherry Rehman, “Pak-U.S. ties should be mutually cooperative,” The Dawn, April 18, 2012. 
26 Bruce Riedel, “Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the Storm,” American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, July 2008, 39. 
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militants run free and causing terrorism is a consequence to Pakistan’s reckless decision 
to provide safe havens.27  Supporting the U.S. goals of peace in Afghanistan is 
counterproductive to Pakistani realism goals against India. Pakistani support of the U.S. 
has come at a high cost as internal terrorist attacks have increased substantially post 
9/11.28  The emergence of the Taliban in Pakistan and other terrorist groups has caused 
considerable strife in the internal stability of Pakistan. The more Pakistan supports the 
U.S. and tries to dry up terrorist safe havens, the more internal terrorism Pakistan faces.   
Another literature category is the status of Kashmir. There is a healthy range of 
literature on this subject on both sides of conflict. Pakistan and Indian newspapers 
frequently report on the status of the standoff and on any political changes or 
developments between the two states. Both states feel the impacts of terrorism that the 
Kashmir conflict has caused. The Indian newspaper Anandabazar Patrika printed an 
article suggesting the way to reduce terrorism is for the two sides to strengthen 
relationships.29  This cooperation would reduce the tensions and lead to conflict reduction 
over the long term. There is a vast amount of opinions on how to resolve the conflict. 
Some of the opinions point out that a permanent stalemate exists. Samina Yasmeen 
mentions that if Pakistan reaches out for a compromise this causes internal complications 
and hardliners in India show no sign of compromising.30  Kashmir citizens are also 
engaged in this conflict and fighting for their own freedom. The Kashmiris significantly 
increased their guerilla warfare attacks against India during the early 1990s.31  Pakistan 
also has to deal with problems from Kashmir separatists on their side of the LoC. In 
February 1992, Pakistani troops fired on a peaceful protest of unarmed Kashmiris  
 
                                                 
27 Usher, Graham. “Dangerous Liaisons, Pakistan, India and Lashkar-e Taiba,” Middle East Report, 
December 31, 2008. 
28 Zia Mian, Sharon Weiner. “America’s Pakistan,” Middle East Report, March 2012, 3. 
29 “India Must Strengthen Ties with Pakistan in View of Afghan Scenario,” Anandabazar Patrika, 
April 17, 2012. 
30 Samina Yasmeen, “Kashmir: The Discourse in Pakistan,” Economic and Political Weekly, February 
2002, 612–613. 
31 Iftikhar Malik, “The Kashmir Dispute:  A Cul-de-Sac in Indo-Pakistan Relations,” in Perspectives 
on Kashmir, ed. Raju Thomas (Boulder, CO:  Westview Press, 1992), 309. 
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attempting to march across the LoC to India in a show of Kashmiri unity.32  Pakistani 
troops occupying the LoC were put in a difficult situation as they are organized to face 
Indian troops not keep Kashmiris on the Pakistani side of the LoC. This literature offers 
connections to the problems in Kashmir to the security competition between India and 
Pakistan, but it does not address the collateral impacts to the U.S. and Afghanistan. 
Yet, there is limited literature connecting the conflict in Kashmir to the conflict in 
Afghanistan. This thesis aims to show that these two are connected. The modern and 
historical literature addresses the Kashmir conflict as its own event. The relationship 
between terrorism in the region and the politics of the Kashmir conflict is well 
documented. Literature that ties the Kashmir conflict to the instability in Afghanistan, 
however, is lacking.   
The U.S. strategy in Afghanistan makes no attempt to integrate the impact of the 
Kashmir conflict. From the U.S. perspective, instability in Afghanistan is linked to 
Taliban insurgent groups that are waging guerilla war and have safe havens both inside 
Afghanistan as well as across in Pakistani controlled tribal areas.33  The literature does 
not connect Kashmir and Afghanistan. Literature speaking to the failure of the narrow 
scope of U.S. strategy in the region is in short supply.   
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis analyzes the connections between state actors engaged in offensive 
realism and the impacts of the friction caused in the relationships. One of the impacts is 
continued instability in Afghanistan. This instability as related to realism is one of factors 
affecting U.S. goals for peace. The thesis evaluates the conflict in Kashmir and identifies 
the scheme of maneuver state actors are using to advance their strategic positions. It will 
examine the political and religious context of the Kashmir conflict as related to realism. 
In order to examine the Kashmir conflict and its impact, this thesis relies on a 
wide variety of sources. The first set of sources discusses Pakistani and Indian strategic 
                                                 
32 Robert G. Wirsing, India Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute (New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 
123. 
33 Usher, “Afghan Triangle,” 21. 
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goals and how the Kashmir conflict plays a major role in achieving them. These relations 
as related to realism are what stir the instability in Afghanistan. Sources proving that this 
instability is why the U.S. cannot achieve peace in Afghanistan are also referenced. The 
next set of sources provides evidence on terrorism as part of regional strategy. As a result 
of the security competition between India and Pakistan, terrorism has become a 
significant threat to the stability in the region. Understanding the impact of terrorism, 
what the terrorists want and where they are is a central theme to the instability that 
realism has caused.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis is organized into three chapters. The first chapter discusses the research 
question of the problem Kashmir brings to South Asia stability. The second chapter 
discusses respective claims Pakistan and India have over Kashmir. This chapter provides 
evidence of historic claims, changes in claims to present day and contrasts the viewpoints 
of each of these states. The third chapter provides evidence of how the offensive realism 
strategy between India and Pakistan impacts U.S. security goals in Afghanistan. The 
conclusion will show how the Kashmir conflict is connected to the U.S. strategy in the 
region. 
 11 
II. PAKISTAN AND INDIA’S CLAIMS TO KASHMIR 
Pakistan and India have an interest in Kashmir for three main reasons each. The 
reasons have their own context and span different lengths of time. They have different 
actors managing them and employ varying strategies to accomplish them. Despite the 
variation in the reasons they all have the same end state. The objective in Kashmir is to 
bring it under full control and be absorbed into the state of Pakistan or India. Bringing 
Kashmir to be a part of Pakistan or India has been a central theme in regional politics 
since 1947. 
The first reason Pakistan has an interest in Kashmir is through a religious context. 
By the general policy of partition Kashmir, being a majority Muslim state, should have 
acceded to Pakistan and joined the rest of the Muslims there. The Kashmir ruling 
maharaja choose to accede to India even though the majority of Kashmiris are Muslim. 
This perplexed the Pakistanis as Pakistan viewed itself as being a protectorate of Muslims 
in the region. Islamists throughout the region had worked many years trying to restore 
Muslim rule in Kashmir.34  They would be betrayed by maharaja Hari Singh’s decision to 
accede to India where Kashmir would be outside the protection of Pakistan. 
The second reason Pakistan maintains a claim in Kashmir is administrative. 
Pakistan was only able to provide representation without input or protest to the British 
plan of partition and the drawing of boundaries. Pakistan, therefore, does not recognize 
Indian claims to Kashmir. Pakistan also had already entered into a written “stand still” 
agreement with the maharaja of Kashmir that India was also offered and declined to do 
so.35  Pakistan maintains debate and protest on the drawing of borderlines, treaties and 
agreements that the British setup, and India and Kashmir have arranged with each other. 
The maharaja signing of the standstill agreement in 1947 was to buy time and camouflage 
the real plan to align with India. The standstill agreement led Pakistan and her supporters 
into a false reality. The Muslim League in Kashmir was under the impression that they 
                                                 
34 Arif Jamal, Shadow War (New York:  Melville House Publishing, 2009), 33. 
35 Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, 40. 
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would become part of Pakistan when Kashmir became independent at midnight on 
August 14, 1947. On this date the Muslim League rejoiced and even hoisted the Pakistani 
flag over several Kashmiri post offices. The ruling maharaja ordered all the flags taken 
down and the Muslim League’s hopes of becoming part of Pakistan were dashed. This 
disappointment created a sequence of events and unrest that is still evident today.36 
The last reason is strategic in nature. This particular claim is the most closely 
related to the execution of realism policy. Pakistan holds on to the Kashmir dispute for 
internal and external reasons. Politicians use the Kashmir issue for political gain and use 
it to rally support for their own political agenda. Pakistan also wants to control the entire 
territory of Kashmir for a strategic buffer zone. India is viewed as the main threat to 
Pakistan and the addition of any territory will give greater border security.37  As the 
decades have passed since partition Pakistan also maintains the claim to the Kashmir 
territory as part of a bigger offensive realism struggle against its main rival India. Finally, 
Kashmir is the lifeblood of Pakistan’s water resources and the headwater of the Indus 
river valley system. Control of the Indus river valley is a strategic objective to assure 
water resource security and sustainment to the health of Pakistan. 
A. RELIGIOUS CLAIM 
Kashmir has had a significant Muslim population even before partition. A 1941 
census pegged Kashmir Valley’s Muslim population at 90%.38  The issue of Kashmir 
being outside of Muslim rule has caused concern for many Muslims living outside of 
Kashmir. Before partition the ruling maharajah was a Hindu minority ruler and had 
governance concerns of his own. Islamists grew in power and established their own 
political group later called the “Reading Room” in the early 1930s.39  The Reading Room 
under the leadership of Shaikh Abdullah transformed into the All Jammu and Kashmir 
Muslim Conference party. The party’s main goal was to get independence from the ruling 
                                                 
36 Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, 41. 
37 Usher, “Afghan Triangle,” 21. 
38 Arif Jamal, Shadow War, 23. 
39 Ibid., 32. 
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Hindu maharaja. Pakistan and Abdullah’s Conference party had similar goals in freeing 
Kashmir from Hindu rule. Pakistan would ultimately take the initiative to free Kashmir 
from the maharaja and assert their claim to Kashmir by sending in tribal invaders in 
October 1947.40  India would respond and send in troops as well resulting in a stalemate. 
A line of control would be established and the conflict that started in 1947 is still in 
progress. 
Pakistan embraces the issue of religion as one of the core arguments for their 
irredentist claims on Kashmir.41  Pakistan continually tries to militarize Kashmir based 
on the justification that the Muslim population should be part of Pakistan as part of the 
terms of partition. Pakistan has fought three wars with India over the Kashmir territory. 
The baseline reason for the wars is that Kashmir is Muslim and the ruling Indians are 
Hindu. Pakistan cannot justify that a Muslim territory that has geographic contiguity to 
Pakistan is not part of the country of Pakistan. It goes against the grain and thinking of 
Muslims in Pakistan. The sole basis for the creation of Pakistan was to create a Muslim 
state where Muslims could live separate from the Hindus. This passion for pulling the 
Kashmiri Muslims in to be part of Pakistan has been part of the cause for three wars. The 
fact that Pakistan has pursued two wars with India over control of Kashmir shows how 
deep the passion is within Pakistan to bring Kashmir under Pakistani control. 
One of the basic conceptions on the establishment of Pakistan is that it was setup 
to be a Muslim homeland.42  Kashmir acceding to Pakistan was a natural fit. Kashmir 
was a majority Muslim state and was contiguous to Pakistan. It appeared to fulfill all the 
necessary criteria for accession into Pakistan. The chief criteria being that Kashmir was a 
Muslim majority state and was already geographically connected to Pakistan.  Kashmir 
by virtue of the establishment of the two-nation theory should belong to Pakistan.43  
Pakistan being a Muslim homeland is an entrenched ideology among Pakistanis. 
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Muslim identity is part of the social fabric in Pakistan. Pakistan has fought to 
assert itself as “not India.”44  Control of Muslim territory is part of the identity of 
Pakistan. The Kashmir accession question is one that touches the identity of Muslims in 
Pakistan. Projecting Muslim identity is an important facet to Pakistan’s foreign policy.   
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, was the first governor general of Pakistan and is 
considered to be the “Father of Pakistan.” He visited Kashmir in 1941 to lend support to 
Muslim groups living there. One reason of Jinnah showing support to Kashmiri Muslims 
was so when Pakistan would eventually form in 1947 that Kashmir would accede to 
Pakistan. Kashmiri Muslims did throw in their lot with the Muslim League, but Jinnah’s 
visit did little to arouse the League’s leadership to embrace future accession to Pakistan. 
Shiekh Abdullah’s Conference party was more interested in attaining Kashmiri self-rule 
than joining with Pakistan. India would win the accession battle with Kashmir Muslims 
by providing them defense and allowing them self-autonomous rule as part of India. 
Pakistan contests this relationship holding onto the fact that the Muslim demographic of 
the Kashmir state is part of the national identity of Pakistan. 
Pakistan’s religious claim to Kashmir is part of a national consensus.45  The 
national consensus is one of state links with Islam. Different government regimes in 
Pakistan have used this consensus to continue their claim to Kashmir. Pakistan projects 
its image as a Muslim protectorate state and therefore its roots to Islam support its claim 
to Kashmir. The Pakistan population supports the Kashmir struggle on grounds that the 
Muslims there should not be part of the secular Hindu state of India, but part of the 
homeland for Muslims in Pakistan. This religious claim to Kashmir is as strong as the 
Muslim identity of the Pakistani state because Kashmir is seen as a part of Pakistan. 
B. PAKISTAN’S ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM 
Outside of the religious context, Pakistan lays administrative claim to Kashmir. 
Through a series of assumptions, agreements and signed documents, Pakistan asserts 
official claim to Kashmir. Pakistan’s administrative argument is one that India and the 
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maharaja of Kashmir cheated it out of Kashmir. As part of the agreements of partition 
and in agreements with the maharaja, Kashmir was to accede to Pakistan. This did not 
happen and Pakistan disputes the administrative process that Kashmir acceded to India. 
Pakistan does not recognize India’s claim to Kashmir on the basis that administratively 
Kashmir should have been part of Pakistan all along. Even Jinnah stated during the 
partition process that Kashmir must join Pakistan.46 
Pakistan and Kashmir would be first to enter into a signed agreement. In August 
1947 the maharaja signed a “stand still” agreement with Pakistan and India declined to 
participate.47  The maharaja wanted time to mull over his options about what to do in the 
future and perhaps be able to pull off an independent Kashmir. The agreement stipulated 
that Pakistan would run the communications and other government support functions. 
India declining to sign the agreement gave the signal that India, from the Pakistani view 
was not interested in Kashmir. The position of the Muslim political leader Shaikh 
Abdullah was ambiguous on the agreement with Pakistan. This further signaled the green 
light that Kashmir was moving toward accession with Pakistan. Since Shaikh Abdullah 
did not offer up any objections and Pakistan was moving into run government services 
the idea that Kashmir was on the road to future accession to Pakistan was settling in.  
After signing the stand still agreement Pakistan ran Kashmir’s daily trade 
functions. They ran and maintained railway links and river links to float timber down 
from the highlands of Kashmir.48  The objective of the stand still agreement was to keep 
government services in place and ensure a transparent transition from the government of 
British India. From the Kashmir maharaja point of view the stand still agreement was in 
effect just that. A temporary agreement that would give time for the Kashmiri 
government to decide whether to try and be independent or accede to India or Pakistan. 
The Pakistan point of view was that since Pakistan was already running the basic 
government services and was gaining expertise in doing so that Kashmir acceding to 
Pakistan was the most obvious administrative process. 
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During the partition process Pakistan was entitled to 17.5% of undivided India. 
What Pakistan actually ended up getting was a meager share of the spoils. Instead of 
receiving 160,000 tons of ordnance as dictated by the Joint Defense Council it only 
received 23,000 tons.49  Most of the arms production facilities and military depots 
remained in India. Mistrust between the two newly formed states prevented a smooth 
transition of material. India held onto a substantial portion of military equipment bound 
for Pakistan. This intentional withholding of Pakistani entitlements by India has caused 
bitter resentment in the eyes of the Pakistanis.   
India’s occupation in Kashmir is seen as just another unfair move by India to hold 
onto territory or equipment that was intended to be part of Pakistan from the beginning 
days of partition. India is seen as not following through on partition agreements. It did 
not give Pakistan material wealth to include military equipment that belonged to Pakistan 
and it did not allow the Muslim state of Kashmir to accede to Pakistan. Kashmir acceding 
to Pakistan was not part of the partition deal. The British recommended to the Kashmir 
maharaja to join Pakistan or India. Pakistan was left with the impression that the 
maharaja was going to accede to Pakistan because he signed the “stand still” agreement 
that obliged Pakistan to run services for Kashmir and they had the first administrative 
claim to the region. Indian occupation is viewed as illegal not being part of the partition 
agreements. Pakistanis also believe that the instrument of accession that the maharaja 
signed with India is fraudulent and demand international adjudication.50 
Many Pakistanis believe that Kashmir accession to Pakistan is the unfinished 
business of partition. Kashmir was denied to Pakistan due to British boundary processes, 
the ruling maharaja instrument of accession to India and Indian occupation. Pakistan 
views all of these processes illegal and void.51  In the eyes of Pakistan, India is occupying 
Pakistani territory that is rightfully Pakistan’s to take. Pakistan does not recognize Indian 
occupation and holds the Kashmir state as being the lost child that has yet to return to the 
fold. 
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When the Boundary Commission was drawing the lines of partition for India and 
Pakistan one of the objectives was to keep existing lines of communication open. 
Meaning that access to Indian and Pakistani held territories should not have to cross the 
other state’s territory. The established roads and rail access points to Kashmir all passed 
through Muslim majority areas of Gurdaspur that were intended to be acceded to 
Pakistan. By deduction of the routing of communication lines Kashmir would have 
accede to Pakistan. Later the head of the Boundary Commission, Viceroy Mountbatten 
made a statement to the press that all the of Gurdaspur district would not be going to 
Pakistan. The Pakistani representative on the Boundary Commission, Chaudhri 
Muhammad Ali became concerned about these public statements and that Viceroy 
Mountbatten should not be talking to the press. Chaudhri Muhammand conferred with 
Viceroy Mountbatten’s chief of staff Lord Ismay if any changes had been made to the 
partition plan. Lord Ismay did not think so and took Chaudhri Muhmmand to show him 
the map. Much to Lord Ismay’s surprise the map had been updated showing that 3 of 4 of 
Gurdaspur’s districts had been redrawn to partition to India.52  This was done without the 
knowledge of Pakistani Boundary Commission representation. A conspiracy theory 
quickly developed in Pakistan that Viceroy Mountbatten in secret coercion with the 
future leadership of India had partitioned the communication links to Kashmir to India.53  
This was done despite Gurdaspur being a Muslim majority area. Without these 
communication links India would have no claim to Kashmir. Here once again Pakistan 
maintains claim to Kashmir based upon improper and corrupt dealings of the Boundary 
Commission. 
During the time of the stand still agreement and while the leadership of the 
Muslim League was in prison the maharaja took this opportunity to purge Muslims from 
Jammu and Kashmir. Dogra troops were employed to pillage and terrorize Muslim 
villages. Some villages in Jammu had been completely gutted. In Jammu the Hindu and 
Sikhs population outnumbered the Muslims. Between Dogra troops and the non-Muslim  
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population about 200,000 Muslims just disappeared and 300,000 fled for their lives to 
Punjab.54  Word of these atrocities by Dogra troops, Hindus and Sikhs would reach the 
government of Pakistan.   
Later in 1947 Pakistan would send in tribal invaders backed by the Pakistani 
military to ensure Kashmir would accede to Pakistan and intervene on behalf of the 
Muslims that were undergoing persecution in Jammu.55  The invasion took place when it 
became clear that the Maharaja was stalling and leaning toward support with India. The 
maharaja not having the defense forces to remain independent signed an accession 
agreement with India. Pakistan would see this as a betrayal from the earlier agreement 
Pakistan had reached with the maharaja and would spark the first war between India and 
Pakistan over Kashmir. India would eventually end up holding 2/3 of Kashmir territory 
while Pakistan would come away with the northern 1/3. Pakistan still holds valid that its 
first agreement with the maharaja is the legitimate claim to Kashmir. 
C. STRATEGIC CLAIM 
Pakistan’s third claim to Kashmir is not religious or administratively connected, 
but strategic in nature. The strategic claim differs from protecting Muslims in Kashmir 
and everything to do with matching the foreign policy agenda of its larger neighbor 
India.56  Pakistan does not want to be outdone by India in the international arena. The 
claim to Kashmir is a source of national prestige and furthering the struggle to accede 
Kashmir to Pakistan is part of Pakistan’s goal to be a regional power. Pakistan tries to 
match the foreign policy goals of India even if it plays a disproportionate role. Pakistan’s 
claim to Kashmir is part of the foreign policy rational of countering Indian power growth. 
Pakistan started out with a “strategic deficit” in comparison to India.57  India had 
more land, people, resources and military arms to name a few. To be able to compete 
with its larger neighbor Pakistan would need all the help it could get. Since the British 
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boundary commission drew lines unfavorable to Pakistan, they had to reach out wherever 
they could to secure additional resources or be left behind by India. The opportunity to 
secure Kashmir made strategic sense. It already had a Muslim population and bordered 
Pakistan. If Pakistan did not lay claim to Kashmir, India would take it and get stronger 
still. Even though India occupies the majority of the state of Kashmir the fact that 
Pakistan holds 1/3 and continues the claim since 1947 is evidence that Pakistan does not 
want India to have the territory and grow more powerful. To counter India power 
Pakistan is executing a realism policy by playing a role in a security competition. 
Pakistan does use the Muslim identity of Pakistan as movement to further its 
strategic goals. Islamists are trained to fight in Kashmir as part of a jihad and freedom 
struggle for the Muslims living under Hindu rule. As India has to deploy more forces into 
Kashmir to repel jihad fighters it takes Indian forces away from other areas along the 
border with Pakistan. By weakening India this therefore strengthens the overall security 
of Pakistan. The jihad is a religious and strategic asset as the benefits of jihad in Kashmir 
indirectly contributes to the security of Pakistan.58  
India and Pakistan have fought with conventional forces four times since 1947 
with the last war concluding in 1999. With both India and Pakistan going nuclear in the 
late 1990s it is conceivable that both sides see conventional war as an obsolete option. 
The conventional wars have never been final and Pakistan continues to employ the proxy 
soldiers with effective results. The nuclear umbrella that both sides enjoy limits a 
response from India. India cannot threaten Pakistan with a large scale force without a 
nuclear reprisal threat. Pakistan harnesses their nuclear capability and continues to deploy 
low-level, non-conventional attacks on India. Attacks between the Pakistani terrorist 
proxy groups and Indian occupying forces are on the rise. In 2008 there were 41 attacks 
doubling the amount of attacks that happened the year prior. There have been 
demonstrations for Kashmir independence, but the attacks appear to have little to do with 
the Kashmir right of self determination. The attacks are based on furthering the strategic 
goals of Pakistan and containing the increase in Indian relative power over Pakistan.59  
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There is little India can do to deter attacks. Since a robust conventional response is not 
possible and India will not back down on Kashmir, future terrorist attacks in India should 
be expected.60 
As more time passes Pakistan finds itself losing its claim to Kashmir. Democratic 
elections are a regular event in Kashmir and Pakistan can do little to shape the outcome. 
To reassert its claim to Kashmir and slow the democratic processes Pakistan launched the 
Kargil war in 1999. The intent was to try and decisively tip the strategic scales to 
Pakistan’s favor.61  It was also hoped the war would revitalize the jihad India had 
succeeded in wearing down and renew the light and shore up international support on the 
context under which Pakistan claimed Kashmir.62  While Pakistan did gain some 
territory, Indian response was strong, erasing any Pakistani gains and Pakistan was forced 
to withdrawal yet again. If Pakistan did nothing though it would be simply ceding 
territory to India without objection. Internal costs to Pakistan were high as the army and 
terrorists groups would return to Pakistan having lost another war to India. 
The military also uses the Kashmir conflict to justify its existence and maintain 
power. In 1947 Pakistan was still in the process of building institutions and the military 
demonstrated that it had the capacity to stand up to India in the first war over Kashmir in 
which Pakistan came away with 1/3 of the territory. As decades past the Kashmir conflict 
became an organizational interest to the military. The military uses the threat of Indian 
occupiers in Kashmir to pump up its own national security relevance.63  This is evidence 
of offensive realism at work. Pakistan uses the Kashmir conflict to build its military as 
part of a security competition.   
The physical territory of Kashmir is one of the concerns for Pakistan.64  A 
particular concern is water security for Pakistan. India is in control of many water works 
originating in Kashmir. In the past they have cut off water supplies to Pakistan. Water 
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disputes between India and Pakistan led to the Indus Waters Treaty. Since the signing of 
the treaty in the 1960s India has respected the terms of the treaty and water continues to 
flow to Pakistan. The treaty has survived three wars and continued hostility between 
India and Pakistan.65  The very fact though that India does have the ability to stop the 
flow of water to Pakistan is of grave concern and a strategic point on why Pakistan wants 
control of the entire Kashmir valley. Kashmir also is geographically contingent and part 
of a symbolic representation of the idea for what created Pakistan in the first place. The 
final map of Pakistan has yet to be finished. Once Kashmir is a secure territory of 
Pakistan then the final boundary lines can be drawn. The two countries will be complete 
and the two-nation theory of one for Hindus and one for Muslims will be finished. 
Pakistan does have justified claims to Kashmir. The very core of Pakistani 
identity is the fact that it is a state created for Muslims to be separate from India.  
Pakistan continues to fight for the Kashmir territory that was drawn out unjustly. The 
realism forces at work inside Pakistan will keep this conflict going in the foreseeable 
future. Pakistan will not back down in holding its claim to Kashmir because to do so 
would mean losing security, territory and power. Pakistan is behaving as the theory of 
realism indicates they should. 
D. INDIA’S CLAIM TO KASHMIR 
India like Pakistan has an interest in Kashmir for three main reasons. India has 
strategic, identity and sovereignty interests in Kashmir. The reasons for India’s struggle 
to hold Kashmir territory and retain its interests there is related to partition and the 
settling of that process that is still taking shape some 65 years later. The partition of a 
once vast India into two separate countries had a profound impact to the region and 
caused India to think about its regional international relations differently. Without the 
security of the British and with Pakistan a new, potentially hostile neighbor, India had to 
now think about its security as an independent state. To secure its northern borders, retain 
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sovereignty and establish its own identity the Kashmir territory would be drawn into 
India’s offensive realism strategy as it established its place as an independent nation. 
E. STRATEGIC 
Offensive realism is a main component to India’s national security strategy. 
Holding Kashmir is vital for its own security and to gain power over its main rival 
Pakistan. Kashmir’s location puts it right in the middle between several different 
countries. Kashmir borders China, Afghanistan, Pakistan and has links to former Soviet 
satellite states. If Kashmir acceded to Pakistan they would receive the security benefit at 
the cost to India. Vice versa more territory along the northern border would ensure 
greater security for India and give Pakistan less power. The addition of Kashmir to India 
for security fits the realism model. 
As the British Boundary Commission was drawing the partition lines, India 
cleverly ensured that it would retain ground links to Kashmir. The princely state of 
Kashmir is one surrounded by vast mountain chains. The beautiful Kashmir Valley that 
the Indus River flows through and contains the Kashmir capital Srinagar is not easily 
accessed. It can only be accessed through the Kashmir Valley that connects into Pakistan 
or through mountain passes. The draft of the partition plan originally had the links to 
Kashmir in the Gurdaspur district going to Pakistan. Without these links in Gurdaspur, 
India would not be able to easily access Kashmir. 
The Indian Prime Minister Nehru was not going to take a chance of not being able 
to access Kashmir and convinced Lord Mountbatten to partition the Gurdaspur links to 
India even though it was a Muslim majority region. This was done under the rational of 
protecting Sikhs from Muslim persecution and giving India control of canal headworks in 
the region. The Boundary Commission thought it would be better that one entity be in 
control of the canal headworks. There remains great debate about the redrawing of the 
Gurdaspur district as it was originally partitioned to Pakistan, but was later redrawn to 




Pakistan and gain the land links to Kashmir. This was done to later gain control of 
Kashmir, gain a strategic advantage over Pakistan, and put pressure on the surrounding 
border now under Indian control.66 
Kashmir and the Gurdaspur district were not the only places India asserted power 
to gain territory over Pakistan. There were over 500 princely states in India that would 
merge to become the modern state that it is today. The guidance that the princely states 
were given from the British during the partition process was to either join India or 
Pakistan. This was only possible if the princely states were geographic contiguous to 
India or Pakistan. The Junagadh State was in this position. It bordered both India and 
Pakistan. The leadership situation was opposite in Kashmir where in Junagadh the ruler 
was a Muslim ruling over an 80% Hindu population. The Muslim ruler there opted to 
accede his princely state to Pakistan. This decision shocked the Indian leadership. It set a 
precedent that a leader could make an accession decision that went against the grain of 
the demographic of the population. Junagadh being a Hindu majority state should have 
acceded to India based on the natural religious division. It also meant that India would 
lose more territory to Pakistan and further break up the great sub-continent. Against the 
advice of British leadership, in November 1947, India sent in troops to Junagadh to 
ensure it acceded to India. The Muslim ruler fled to Pakistan and the chief minister 
surrendered the state based on a plebiscite where the population could determine the 
accession. India, confident that the Hindu majority would choose India agreed to a 
plebiscite.67  India increased their territory as the theory of realism says they would. 
The situation in Kashmir is similar to the situation in Junagadh. The princely state 
had a ruler that practiced a religion that was minority to the demographic of the 
population. Except in Kashmir it was an opposite situation where the ruler was a Hindu 
ruling over a Muslim majority. Pakistan having been out maneuvered in Gurdaspur and in 
the process of losing Junagadh was not going to lose out in Kashmir. Kashmir, after all, 
did have a Muslim majority and should therefore accede to Pakistan. To ensure accession 
Pakistan this time sent in armed tribal invaders to secure Kashmir. The ruling maharaja in 
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a desperate plea for security reached out to India for military assistance. India would 
provide security, but only if the maharaja signed over accession of Kashmir to India. The 
maharaja being out of options signed the accession agreement in October 1947, and India 
sent in troops to secure Kashmir. 
India and Pakistan would fight a 14 month long war over Kashmir that would 
eventually leave the land divided with 2/3 under India control and 1/3 under Pakistan 
control. As part of the peace agreement India agreed to a plebiscite where the people can 
decide accession similar to what was done in Junagadh. Agreeing to a plebiscite would 
calm the conflict down in Kashmir and give India time to solidify its occupation forces. 
India did just that and sent up defensive positions in Kashmir. India, not being confident 
that the Kashmiri’s would choose to accede to India in a plebiscite never did have one. 
To this day the Kashmiri’s have never been given a voter’s choice to decide. Kashmiri’s 
have protested India’s reluctance to hold a plebiscite. India has responded to protests with 
repressive measures and at times has placed the Kashmiri, Muslim leader Sheikh 
Abdullah in prison.68  
Here again we see India making decisions that will only benefit its security and 
power through gaining more territory. In Junagadh it accepted the accession document 
the ruler signed with Pakistan and even recognized it as Pakistani territory. India then 
forced a plebiscite that turned the tide and let that decision rule the accession justification 
of Junagadh to India. In Kashmir it used the accession agreement the maharaja signed 
with India as the justification to occupy Kashmir. Pakistan objects to this based on the 
maharaja signing it under duress and India used a similar rational against it to obtain 
Junagadh. India also has refused to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir even though it did so in 
Junagadh. This shows India is willing to contradict its own policies if it can gain an 
advantage over a rival. This is direct evidence of offensive realism at work. India is 
willing to craft and execute whatever policy is necessary to ensure its own strategic goals 
fitting the theory or realism.   
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India knew that controlling Kashmir would be of immense strategic value being 
the buffer zone between Pakistan and China. It was the largest princely landmass and 
would be of an advantage to any state that controlled it.69  In addition to its strategic 
location it also has strategic resources that are of significant economic and political 
benefit. The headwaters of the Indus River system run through Kashmir. The Indus River 
is the main water supply for the entire nation of Pakistan. Pakistan uses the Indus River 
for irrigation, crop production, trade and other water needed activities. Without the Indus 
River the land of Pakistan would dry up and become an arid desert. Partition left India in 
control of several key water works to include the Indus River headwaters.70 
Control of Pakistan’s water supply would leave India in a position of strength 
over Pakistan. Pakistani leadership felt the situation first hand when in April 1948 India 
turned off the water supply from the Sutlej River. This could have caused famine in 
Pakistan and turned the Pakistani state of Punjab into a desert. American diplomats 
stepped in and helped negotiate a water rights agreement and in 1960 the Indus Water 
Treaty was signed.71  So far India and Pakistan have cooperated on water sharing 
agreements. This does not diminish the fact that India has put itself in the position of 
power and control over Pakistan’s water supply. The Indus River running through 
Kashmir is a key supplier of Pakistan’s water. The fact that India can divert, slow or 
temporarily stop the Indus River by having control of Kashmir puts them in a significant 
advantage over Pakistan. If relations between the two nations significantly deteriorated 
India could bring Pakistan to the negotiating table and be in a position of strength without 
even having to mobilize the army or firing a shot. The simple threat of turning off the 
water is enough for Pakistan to pause and consider what would happen to their country if 
the Indus River dried up. Control of the Kashmir territory puts India in the power position 
of strength over Pakistan and is another example of offensive realism at work. 
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When considering other models to test India’s actions in Kashmir offensive 
realism is the only model that fits the best. What is happening in Kashmir does not fit a 
liberalism model. The citizens there do not have the right for self-determination or 
secession if they choose to do so. They have been continually denied a plebiscite and 
lived under the threat of occupying Indian forces. If India is a secular, democratic state 
then it contradicts itself in the management of Kashmir.72  India controls Kashmiri free 
speech, trade and economic links. The citizens are only granted as much latitude as the 
occupying Indian forces will allow. This further demonstrates the resolve of India’s 
realism efforts in Kashmir. If India were to let Kashmir go and work through liberalism it 
would create an identity crisis inside the sub-continent. 
F. IDENTITY 
The national identity of India is a secular government and a governing body 
where all religions can exist. If Kashmir were to accede to Pakistan it would mean that 
India’s secularism was superficial with religion being the only basis for the creation of a 
state.73  The new government of India created an ideology of secularism and desired a 
democratic state encompassing numerous cultural communities. Kashmir, therefore, must 
be part of India and without it the legitimacy of India’s secular government could be 
called into question. If Muslim states were not safe in India that could mean further 
shedding of Muslim territories around the Pakistan border and uprisings in other states 
challenging the Indian government. This was demonstrated by Kashmiri Muslim 
uprisings in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As a result, India experienced a surge in 
Hindu nationalism against the revolt in Kashmir as noted by a shift in political party 
power in Delhi toward anti-Muslim sentiments. However, party politics had to moderate 
to rule all the coalition governments and secular attitudes that embody the sub-
continent.74  This is evidence that the overall identity of India is a place that all religions 
and people can exist to include Kashmir. 
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Part of India’s identity is that it is a unified home for all South-Asians.75  Before 
the British helped unify the sub-continent it was a place of over 500 separate princely 
states using hundreds of different languages. In order for the concept of a unified India to 
work it would have to be an inclusive, secular state that was a place for all people to 
participate in the political system. An India without a Kashmir would threaten the very 
identity of the Indian state. It would serve to threaten the concept that India is a place 
where all South-Asians can live regardless of religion. If India withdrew its claim to 
Kashmir the core ideology of India could be at risk.76 
The threat to India’s core ideology helps explain why India is so aggressive in 
holding the Kashmir territory. During the partition process there was a faction of Hindu’s 
that did not want partition based on the fact that India was to be a place that all people 
could live. Even Lord Mountbatten stated that he regretted the partition plan and not 
being able to keep the sub-continent united.77  The political forces that did not want 
partition would watch as the state of Pakistan seceded and the state of East Pakistan later 
the country of Bangladesh seceded as well. The once great sub-continent was now 
divided into three separate parts. If Kashmir acceded to Pakistan or became its own 
independent state this would further carve up India. This would also send a signal to other 
states with Muslim majorities along the Pakistan border that it is better to accede to 
Pakistan or take a chance with their own independence. If Kashmir goes its own way then 
the door would open for other states to go their own way. To hold the state of India 
together and keep the ideology of India being a secular state for all groups India holds 
Kashmir with security forces, repression and terror.78 
India’s claim to be an ethno-religious secular state means that all religious groups 
can live in India and invalidates the partition logic that Muslim majority states should 
accede to Pakistan. It also created the secular government to allow room for all 
competing arguments to be heard in Delhi. If India were to let Kashmir hold a plebiscite 
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for independence or allow them to accede to Pakistan based on religious or political 
differences it could challenge and call into question the founding principles of India 
itself.79  Other states could fragment and the united sub-continent could come apart and 
disintegrate back to individual rule of 500 plus princely states. The risk of Kashmir 
causing disintegration of the vast India state is too great for India. It cannot allow a 
plebiscite for Kashmir independence. If a voter majority result called for secession from 
India or independence it could be devastating to Indian domestic politics. 
If Kashmir were to become independent there would be renewed calls for 
independence from states throughout India. The states such as Hyderabad and Junagadh 
that India had to force accession through military means would now have the justification 
to declare their independence. Other princely states could follow suit. This would put 
India into a serious domestic identity crisis. Part of the struggle for India to hold Kashmir 
is rooted in the fundamentals of the makeup of the Indian secular state. 
G. SOVEREIGNTY  
Strategic reasons and ideology reasons make up most of the Kashmir story. The 
remaining claim to Kashmir is one of Indian sovereignty. The Kashmir maharaja did sign 
the Instrument of Accession to join India and he was the competent authority to do so. 
India has also ruled Kashmir for last 60 years establishing itself with government 
institutions that link Kashmir as any other state to Delhi. In Kashmir, India had also 
achieved a superior diplomatic relationship with the maharaja over its rivals in Pakistan. 
Before partition, Kashmir was sending diplomatic signals that were leaning 
toward a more favorable relationship with India. The maharaja communicated more 
regularly with Indian leaders than with those in Pakistan. He requested an Indian military 
officer temporarily replace his commander in chief. The internal bureaucracy in India 
corresponded regularly on what the best options were to secure Kashmir. Sardar Patel the 
minister for homeland affairs in India had directly involved himself in the plan to accede 
Kashmir to India.80 
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During the summer months of 1947 India was aggressively building connecting 
infrastructure into Kashmir. All this was being done while Pakistan had signed a stand 
still agreement with Kashmir and agreed to take on infrastructure management. India had 
essentially ignored the stand still agreement Kashmir had with Pakistan. India was 
improving communications with Kashmir by upgrading telegraph, telephone and wireless 
systems and improving roads. The only way India can access the Kashmir Valley is 
through mountain passes. To facilitate rapid movement of supplies into Kashmir from 
India a secure road system would have to be developed. Kashmir was building an all 
weather road linking the Kashmir Valley with Jammu that could then connect into greater 
India. India having secured the Gurdaspur district for access to Kashmir was busy 
building infrastructure there so supplies and equipment could pass into Kashmir without 
having to go through Pakistani territory. This is all evidence that India was preparing to 
take over Kashmir and was making moves to rapidly secure its position if a conflict with 
Pakistan should flare up.81 
Pakistan was aware of the diplomatic maneuvering and construction projects India 
had been undertaking. The final straw would be when India included Kashmir in their 
postal system. Pakistan produced evidence of this fact by producing a memorandum 
dated September 1947 and signed by the Indian Postal Director-General listing which 
towns in Kashmir were listed as part of India. A stipulation of the stand still agreement 
that Pakistan had signed with Kashmir was that Pakistan would run the postal system for 
Kashmir.82  Pakistan irritated with India’s behind the scenes meddling started armed 
incursions into Kashmir in the fall of 1947. In October 1947 tribal invaders entered 
Kashmir and were moving on the capital Srinagar. To secure Indian military support to 
repel the invaders the maharaja was left with no choice, but to sign the Instrument of 
Accession with India. India would send in troops and hold the Instrument of Accession as 
the administrative proof and legal binding authority that Kashmir belongs under the 
dominion of Indian sovereignty.  
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India has allowed internal elections for the Kashmir’s to choose their domestic 
leadership. There has been much debate about the fairness of these elections as India has 
been accused of meddling in the ballot boxes to ensure pro-India politicians win the seats 
in government. During the late 1970s and early 1980s Kashmir entered a period of peace. 
In 1977 Sheikh Abdullah won overwhelming support in what was perceived to be the 
first fair election in Kashmir. He ruled until his death in 1982. During his rule Kashmir 
was quiet and it seemed as if accession to India was complete. During Abdullah’s funeral 
the Indian flag was draped over his casket in a striking symbol that Kashmir was part of 
India.83  This is an example of how India sees Kashmir as a permanent state of India. In 
India’s eyes there is no longer a question of accession or whether Pakistan has a legal 
argument to the territory. Kashmir is part of India and any challenge to the territory is 
perceived as a threat to Indian sovereignty. 
As far as India is concerned the question of Kashmir accession is a dead issue. It 
has fought and won three wars with Pakistan over the territory. India sees the territory as 
a vital piece of property for its national security and a source of strength to assert its 
regional dominance over regional rivals. It will not let Kashmir fall into Pakistan or 
Chinese control as losing Kashmir to a rival or independence would shake the very 
foundation of Indian ideology. Any challenge from a rival to Kashmir is a threat to Indian 
sovereignty, which India will defend with military force.   In the past India has 
successfully demonstrated its military means to put down domestic uprising and outside 
threats. It is unlikely that India will ever concede its position in Kashmir to Pakistani 
interests or anything else. 
H. TERRORISM AND COLLATERAL DAMAGE 
In executing the realism policy proxy terrorism has emerged as a significant force 
in the region. The terrorism has grown beyond the ability for the regional states to control 
or defend against. The terrorist activity related to Kashmir and the realism clash has three 
fronts. The first front is terrorism against Indian occupying forces in Kashmir itself. 
These attacks are waged by insurgents and aimed at the Indian military occupying forces. 
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The second front is terrorism in greater India designed to tie up Indian military and law 
enforcement resources outside of Kashmir. Terrorists are directly targeting civilians and 
government institutions inside India straining its security institutions. The third front is 
domestic terrorism inside of Pakistan. Terrorist forces that were designed for attacks in 
Kashmir have redirected their efforts against the Pakistan government for creating an 
alliance with the U.S. backed war in Afghanistan. The Pakistan ambassador to the U.S. 
has commented on the risks of shifting Pakistan’s Afghan policy from what it was in the 
1990s has had considerable costs.84  All three of the terrorist fronts developed as both 
India and Pakistan are engaged in an International Relations offensive realism struggle to 
gain power, influence and security over the other and of the Kashmir territory. The three 
fronts are interlinked and often out of control caused by ambitious realism zeal of the two 
state actors India and Pakistan. 
The first front is conducted against Indian occupying forces in Kashmir. India 
conducts regular battle with Muslim fidayeen (freedom fighter) insurgents in Kashmir. 
The fidayeen insurgents goal is, in the words of one Pakistani inter-service intelligence 
agent (ISI), to “prick and bleed India.”85  By creating a guerrilla war of attrition the intent 
is to wear India down over time. As years pass and the Indian casualty count increases, 
the intent of the strategy is that India will lose interest in the Kashmir region and 
withdrawal its occupying forces. This will leave the door open for Pakistan to assert 
control over the Kashmir territory. This strategy has unfortunate consequences as India 
has responded to terrorist attacks with stiff opposition turning Kashmir into a battlefield 
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The problems with fighting a Fabian strategy war of attrition are that it takes a 
long time to wear down the enemy to the point where they concede. To speed up the 
attrition process in settling the war in Kashmir, insurgents have taken the war into greater 
India creating the second front of terrorism. Terrorists have attacked targets in the capital 
Delhi and more recently a major attack was conducted in Mumbai in 2008. The Mumbai 
attack was particularly deadly and well orchestrated killing 172 people.86  The intent of 
attacks outside of Kashmir is to impact the daily life of the general population of India. 
By taking the fight outside of Kashmir and to the general population, it is hoped that the 
citizens of India will put political pressure on the government to withdrawal from 
Kashmir. It is one thing for a citizen to read about terrorist attacks in Kashmir on the 
Indian military and another to actually feel and witness terrorist attacks in person. The 
terrorists hope that this will speed up the “prick and bleed” method by pricking and 
bleeding India closer to home and in the hearts of the population at large. 
The third front of terrorism is a domestic battle that Pakistan is having to deal 
with. Pakistan and India do not desire a total war over the Kashmir territory dispute. They 
have fought wars in the past and it has always ended in a stalemate or losing terms for 
Pakistan with India holding the Kashmir territory. Pakistan has switched its strategy from 
one of overt aggressive action against India to a covert form using proxy soldiers as 
terrorist to “Prick and Bleed” India as the ISI agent mentioned. The proxy soldiers have 
been effective incurring 50,000 casualties since 1989 and causing India to send in 
additional occupying forces that number over 400,000.87  The downside is that the 
inspiration that drives the proxy soldiers is one that is conducting jihad against the Hindu 
invaders in Kashmir. After the 9/11 attacks the U.S. became a staunch ally with Pakistan. 
The insurgents were not too pleased with Pakistan aligning with American “infidels” and 
put their own pressure on the Pakistani government through terrorism.  
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The realism policy execution is a powerful force in the region. All the stake 
holders are intertwined and impacted in this policy. It is a policy that cannot be easily 
changed, but it can be predicted. By testing future policy decisions for the region against 
realism it can be predicted how the regional actors will respond to include the terrorists. 
India and Pakistan are responding as the offensive realism would predict. They both have 
acquired nuclear weapons. Pakistan has resorted to the use of proxy terrorism as a means 
to gain security over India. India holds Kashmir for strategic buffer zone and the ability 
to control the water supply life blood of Pakistan. Finally, both are attempting to gain 










III. KASHMIR’S IMPACT TO UNITED STATES IN 
AFGHANISTAN 
The Kashmir conflict between Pakistan and India impacts the United States in at 
least three significant ways. Kashmir is tied to the support of terrorist sanctuaries, future 
security of Afghanistan, and an inhibitor to the growth of India. As long as there are sour 
relations between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, Afghanistan will continue to be a 
battleground between these two regional hegemons. This offensive realism conflict 
between India and Pakistan destabilizes Afghanistan landscape and lends support to the 
terrorist safe havens. India expends a vast amount of resources securing Kashmir and 
deploying resources in Afghanistan. These resources could be deployed elsewhere and 
could better serve as a check to China’s growth in the long term. However, the final 
status of Kashmir continues to be a central regional issue that keeps the Central Asia 
region from obtaining a meaningful security. 
President Obama has said that one of America’s greatest threats is terrorist safe 
havens along the Afghanistan / Pakistan border.88  The threat of future terrorism coming 
out of Afghanistan is of concern for the U.S. The 9/11 terrorist attack planning did 
originate in Afghanistan. Pakistan relies on the safe havens to draw insurgents from to 
fight India in Kashmir. There is a link between the terrorist safe havens and the conflict 
in Kashmir. Pakistan draws on the safe havens to further its proxy war in Kashmir against 
India. Pakistan would be placed in a weaker position against India if it loses the terrorist 
safe havens. 
The overall long-term security of Afghanistan is tied to the cooperation of 
Pakistan in supporting nation building. The more secure the Karzai led government 
becomes the more Pakistan seeks to undermine security. Pakistan has the most 
advantageous geographic position to assist or block the flow of supplies into Afghanistan. 
They routinely hold up supply convoys and make it difficult for the movement of 
equipment from the sea to land locked Afghanistan. Pakistan also wants a government in 
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Afghanistan that it can control. The Karzai government could be independent from 
Pakistani influence and this again impacts Pakistan’s ability to run terrorist safe havens.  
Pakistan behaves this way because they are executing a realist policy to gain power and 
security over their rival India. 
The U.S., in planning ahead for the long-term security of the entire hemisphere, is 
looking to India to take up security duties and India could be a useful ally in checking the 
power growth of China. India is quietly working to provide infrastructure and security 
support to Afghanistan. India could do more to support nation building in Afghanistan, 
but is concerned about a challenged response from Pakistan. If Pakistan sees India power 
growth in Afghanistan as being a threat, it could open up conflict in Kashmir, send more 
terrorists to India or undermine efforts in Afghanistan. India therefore will not be as 
much use in building security in Afghanistan or checking the power of China until the 
Kashmir conflict is settled. 
A. TERRORIST SAFE HAVENS 
In recent history Afghanistan has been a spawning ground for Islamic 
fundamentalism. As far back as the 1970s Pakistan began creating and funding support of 
Islamic fundamentalist guerillas in Afghanistan. Pakistan initially created the guerilla 
groups for retaliation of Afghanistan for supporting an insurgency in the Pakistani 
province of Baluchistan. Over the decades several different groups for different security 
needs in the region would use these guerillas as pawns. The Central Intelligence Agency 
and Saudi Arabia used the guerillas to push the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. After 
the Soviet Union left Afghanistan, Pakistan would routinely draw on the guerillas that 
fought against the Soviets to wage proxy war against India in Kashmir and conduct 
terrorist attacks in greater India. Osama bin Laden is known to have grown his Al Qaeda 
network from the terrorist safe havens that Pakistan helped create. Afghanistan was and 
continues to be a preferred landscape of spawning Islamic fundamentalism.89 
After the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, Pakistan would find a new 
use for the mujahedin freedom fighters. They would be rerouted to fight in Kashmir. The 
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new ideology was a religious duty to rid Kashmir of Hindus and the entire world from the 
yoke of polytheists.90  Since 1991 the camps in Afghanistan that had been used to train 
insurgents to fight the Soviets were now being used to fight the Indians in Kashmir. The 
Pakistani Inter service Intelligence (ISI) has taken over the running of terrorist training 
camps and uses them to create proxy soldiers to fight India. 
Islamic terrorism has replaced Cold War Communism as a primary threat to the 
U.S.91  President Obama has articulated that eliminating Al Qaeda from the region is a 
principal goal of the U.S.92  Pakistan has returned to be a frontline ally with the U.S. in 
combating terrorism just as it was with the U.S. in combating Communism. Pakistani 
assistance is critical in supporting U.S. goals of dismantling terrorist networks. There is a 
difference though this time. Pakistan only half-heartedly supports U.S. efforts to 
dismantle terrorist networks along the border region with Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
Pakistan has become an unreliable partner in combating terrorism. While Pakistan has 
shown some efforts to break up terrorist threats from Al Qaeda and the Tehrike-e-Taliban 
Pakistan (TTP) (that are groups that threaten Pakistan) it is unwilling to disburse other 
terrorist groups. This is because Pakistan relies on proxy soldiers that spawn in these 
terrorist safe havens to conduct attacks in India.93 
The U.S. Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld said in summer 2002 that there 
were indications of Al Qaeda fighters infiltrating Kashmir territory.94 After the fall of the 
Taliban many Al Qaeda fighters fled to Kashmir. It was estimated in 2002 that there were 
as many as 300 Al Qaeda fighters operating in Kashmir territory. Dismantling the Al 
Qaeda network and stopping infiltration of Al Qaeda fighters is a primary objective of the 
Global War on Terror. The previous President of Pakistan General Musharraf had made 
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promises to stop infiltration of terrorist but had not acted to do so. Indian officials 
indicated that if the terrorist camps funded by Pakistan survive then there would not be 
any stoppage of the spread of terrorist fighters. Pakistan dismantling the training camps is 
the only way to stop the infiltration and movement of terrorist fighters.95 
After the conclusion of the Soviet conflict in Afghanistan and the end of the Cold 
War the U.S. did not have a strategic need for Pakistan. In the early 1990s President 
George H.W. Bush cut off economic and military aide to Pakistan. During this period of 
the 1990s the terrorist camps were able to grow in strength unchecked by the Western 
World. They were able to use arms left by the Soviets, use funds from narcotics trade and 
use resources from Pakistan.96  They would spill into Kashmir and take the Islamic 
fundamentalist fight against the Hindus. The early 1990s crisis in Kashmir coincided with 
the triumph of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan. It took the 9/11, terrorist attacks for the 
U.S. to renew its strategic relationship with Pakistan. By this time though Pakistan had 
been using the terrorists camps for its own strategic advantage and needed them for the 
war with India in Kashmir. The Soviet threat was an incentive for Pakistan to cooperate 
with the U.S. Pakistan does not have the same incentive to cooperate with the U.S. in the 
Global War on Terror or in the security of Afghanistan. 
A reason Pakistan resists cooperating with the U.S. is that it is a state sponsor of 
terrorism. Pakistan sponsors terrorism and supports the Taliban and Kashmir insurgents 
because it serves their strategic objectives. Pakistan uses terrorist networks to conduct a 
proxy war against India. These terrorist networks serve to strengthen Pakistan’s realism 
goals in the region. Pakistan cannot openly attack India or use its own troops to 
destabilize and weaken Afghanistan. Instead, it draws on terrorist networks to conduct 
attacks in Afghanistan, Kashmir and India. These Pakistani sponsored terrorist networks 
have attacked Coalition Forces in Afghanistan causing the U.S. to have concern.97  Here 
again there is evidence of realism at work. 
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The U.S. goals in Afghanistan are to create an independent state that is strong 
enough to stand on its own. This is in direct contrast to Pakistan’s goals for Afghanistan. 
Pakistan desires a weak government in Kabul that it can influence. This influence can 
then be wielded to support a permissive environment where extremists groups can 
operate and a Afghani government that will reduce Indian political and economic 
efforts.98  Pakistan has continued to support Taliban resurgence by enabling its safe 
havens and providing political support for Taliban reconciliation talks with Afghanistan.   
The U.S. will continue to be only achieving temporary success in disrupting 
terrorist networks because the reason terrorist safe havens exist is from funding by 
Pakistan. An Afghan state that is pro-Pakistan will give Pakistan the strategic depth it 
needs in its struggle against India. Pakistan can then be free and clear like it was in the 
1990s to have a rear base in which it can train and furnish militants to fight in Kashmir 
and elsewhere in India. The proxy soldiers conducting jihad attacks against India is one 
of the forefront tenets of Pakistan’s foreign policy.99  Pakistan’s ISI has been waging this 
war against India for nearly half a century. The U.S. cannot simply seek a Pakistani 
foreign policy change that goes against its actual foreign interests.   The U.S. will be 
unsuccessful in changing Pakistan’s foreign policy until relations between India and 
Pakistan improve. 
To try and persuade Pakistan in taking on a greater role in combating terrorist safe 
havens the U.S. has engaged in some quiet diplomacy in the Kashmir conflict. The 
Obama administration has supported Indian government talks with Kashmir separatist 
groups.100  The U.S. has a dilemma with short and long-term goals. U.S. short term goals 
require driving out terrorist safe havens, which it cannot do without Pakistani support. 
U.S. long-term goals include a continued thawing of the relations with India and have 
India take on a greater security role in the region. If the U.S. gets involved in Kashmir it 
risks alienating relations with India, which it sees as only a bilateral issue with Pakistan. 
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The short term goals are taking precedence as the U.S. is trying to keep the border calm 
between India and Pakistan. This is evidenced by the quiet diplomacy approach to keep 
the Indians, Kashmiris and Pakistanis talking. If relations between Pakistan and India 
improve then Pakistan can turn more of its military resources to terrorist safe havens that 
have been so effective at attacking U.S. troops and causing instability in Afghanistan.101 
B. FUTURE SECURITY OF AFGHANISTAN 
Afghanistan has become a place that Pakistan and India attempt to assert strength 
over the other. It is a battlefield where both seek to gain a geopolitical defense and 
promote favorable economy activity while denying the other of the same objectives.102  
Their offensive realism goals complicate efforts to place Afghanistan on a path toward 
sustainment and self-rule free from outside influences. All the U.S. can try and do is 
contain the situation between India and Pakistan. The U.S. is unable to advance its own 
goals as India and Pakistan wreck and undermine the politics and landscape of the region 
in support of their own agendas separate from the U.S. This helps explain why the 
conflict in Afghanistan has now become the longest conflict in which the U.S. has been 
actively engaged. 
The future of Afghanistan becoming a stable, functioning state or remaining a 
fragmented place of chaos is tied to the relations between India and Pakistan. Afghanistan 
cannot be put on a path to sustainment and self-rule without reliving the tensions between 
the two power players in the region. As long has Pakistan maintains a fear of India it will 
work to undermine security efforts in Afghanistan. President Obama has remarked that 
finding a solution to the Kashmir conflict is the surest way to calm the fears of 
Pakistan.103  Only when Pakistan and India are on good relations will the need for 
terrorist safe havens disappear and the meddling in Afghanistan for state self-interest will 
change to building an effective, functioning Afghanistan. 
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Pakistan views Afghanistan as its strategic backyard and will not yield to any 
Indian influence in the region.104  India has already dismembered Pakistan once before in 
supporting the spin off of Bangladesh. If India gains a strong position in Afghanistan it 
would be in a position to influence Pakistan on both sides of the border and potentially 
further dismember Pakistan. Islamabad has gone to great lengths to check Indian 
influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan supported the mujahedeen in chasing out the Soviets 
who at the time were an ally of India. Later Pakistan would support the Taliban to keep 
out the pro-India Northern Alliance.105  Pakistan still supports the Taliban as 
Afghanistan’s President, Karzai comes from the Northern Alliance. 
The U.S. is unable to defeat the Taliban without help from Pakistan. 
Unfortunately Pakistan is aiding the Taliban and allows them free movement along the 
Pakistan and Afghanistan border. Afghanistan provides strategic depth for Pakistan and 
having porous border where insurgents can move freely between the states only serves to 
aid Pakistan’s foreign policy. The border situation will not change until Pakistan resolves 
its rivalry with India.106  The issue of the final state of Kashmir is a central concern that 
keeps India and Pakistan poised for conflict with each other. 
The majority of Pakistan’s troops are along the Indian border and LoC in the 
Kashmir region. It is the fear of India that keeps Pakistan from moving troops from the 
Indian border to police and secure the Afghanistan border.107  This rivalry has caused 
both nations to develop nuclear weapons and deploy a million troops on their border 
region.108  The hard power that both sides posses has taken them into an offensive 
realism struggle of security competition. The possession of nuclear weapons has made 
conventional conflict obsolete. Both sides have turned to Afghanistan to further their own 
foreign policy goals. India is seeking a strong Afghani state that will cause Pakistan to 
have to shift troops. Pakistan desires a weak Afghani state for the opposite reasons. 
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India has become a major supporter of U.S. goals in developing a secure 
Afghanistan. U.S. Defense Secretary, Leon Panetta has criticized Pakistan for not 
cracking down on terrorist safe havens and undermining security efforts in Afghanistan. 
He goes on to signal support for continued Indian engagement in Afghanistan.109  India 
has been engaged in commercial and economic development as well as training of 
Afghani security forces. India’s support has caused the U.S. to shift policy away from 
Pakistan and in support of India. The more support India lends to Afghani security the 
more the U.S. can draw down. 
India has been a significant partner in Afghanistan reconstruction efforts. Delhi 
has assisted in building roads, electricity grids, has opened four consulates and has given 
at $1.2 billion aid package to the Afghani government. This is a sizable investment to a 
Muslim nation from a secular predominately Hindu nation. Some of the roads India has 
been building connect Afghanistan to the Iranian port of Chabahar.110  This bypasses the 
Pakistani port of Karachi and gives India access to trade with Afghanistan without having 
to deal with any overland issues of Pakistan blocking Afghani, Indian trade. These efforts 
are part of India’s realism goals to gain influence and power in Afghanistan. An 
economically sound Karzai government in Afghanistan does not serve the foreign policy 
goals of Pakistan. 
The mismatch of Indian and Pakistani goals for Afghanistan causes friction and 
potential for conflict. This friction is caused by two rivals executing a realism policy in 
the region. Realism dictates a security competition and as part of this competition there is 
conflict between India and Pakistan. As much as the U.S. would like India to take on a 
bigger role in Afghanistan nation building it is reluctant to widen its footprint over 
concerns of retaliation and other undermining efforts from Pakistan. If Pakistan suffers a 
strategic defeat in Afghanistan by India consolidating power there it may be tempted to 
lash out through attacks on India.111  As Indian power rises Pakistan will rely more on 
Islamic militancy to further its foreign policy goals. While the U.S. welcomes Indian 
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support the Pakistanis oppose it and undermine security efforts such as closing NATO 
supply lines. Unless the relationship between India and Pakistan improves, Afghanistan 
will likely stay in a security quagmire.  
Managing diplomacy between India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States 
is a delicate balance. All four of them have high stakes in South Asia. President Karzai 
has accepted Indian aid and at the same time called Pakistan his nation’s twin brother.112  
Outside aid is vital for the security building of Afghanistan and accepting Indian aid is a 
big part of that. Pakistan’s response to Indian aid in Afghanistan does cause there to be a 
high degree of risk for both India and Afghanistan. In an effort to hinder the Afghani, 
Indian relationship Pakistan could block trade between the two countries and encourage 
insurgent attacks on Indian projects in Afghanistan as well as escalating unrest in 
Kashmir and reengaging in Mumbai style terrorist attacks.113  For these reasons 
Afghanistan and India approach each other with a light footprint not wanting to ignite 
trouble with Pakistan. This slow growth approach hurts the U.S. and extends the time of 
security progress in Afghanistan. 
C. U.S. / INDIA ROLE IN SOUTH ASIA 
The U.S. would receive tremendous benefit if India would take up a robust role in 
Afghanistan. While India has deployed 500 personnel to Afghanistan to assist in 
economic and diplomatic efforts, it has not taken on any roles in security stabilization or 
counter insurgency efforts. The associated risks are too high for India to take on a bigger 
role. Its troops would be easy targets for Afghan militants, and Indian troops on the 
ground in Afghanistan risk a renewal of attacks in Kashmir.114  Pakistan would be 
surrounded by Indian troops and could escalate tensions in Kashmir to cause India to 
withdrawal its forces from Afghanistan to participate in security of Kashmir. 
India’s future role as a potential South Asia hegemon that can manage the security 
of the region is an interest to the U.S. President Obama has remarked that Indian 
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involvement is critical to the future of Afghanistan. He pointed out that strategic 
partnership Afghanistan and India have outlined for each other will assist with growing 
security of the region.115  The more India can support South Asia security the less the 
U.S. has to do and can shift its resources to the Pacific Region. As the U.S. draws down 
its security efforts in the Middle East and South Asia there is potential for China to move 
in and dominate the region. The U.S. is counting on India to be a counterweight that will 
check Chinese influence and growth in South Asia.116 
If India and Pakistan can resolve one of their most important issues by resolving 
the Kashmir dispute there will be fewer security threats along the Indo-Pak border. 
Pakistan will then be in a better security position that it can shift forces from along the 
Indo-Pak border to roll up terrorist safe havens along the Afghani-Pak border.117  
Kashmir is the center of gravity that keeps the circle of conflict going between India, 
Pakistan and Afghanistan. Therefore, one of the main U.S. interests is to assist India and 
Pakistan in settling their long term disputes. 
The long running conflict between India and Pakistan has caused the U.S. to be 
held hostage to the competing foreign policy goals between the two of them.118  The 
more aid the U.S. gives to Pakistan to assist with counter-terrorism efforts is perceived to 
be a threat to India by building up Pakistani military power. India in turn sees the 
Kashmir issue to be a bilateral conflict between India and Pakistan. If the U.S. asserts 
power to settle the dispute it risks cooling relations with India and India is needed for a 
bigger long term role. This explains why the U.S. is reluctant to speak out against human 
rights violations in Kashmir.119  The more the U.S. tries to get the roots of the problems 
in the region the more the India and Pakistan quarrel with each other and alienate the U.S. 
Both India and Pakistan are making their decisions as the policy of realism would expect. 
Every action to strengthen one side results in the other side trying to undermine it. 
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As long as Pakistan views India as the main strategic threat it will have little 
interest in full cooperation in the security of Afghanistan. The best the U.S. can try and 
do is to mitigate the exposure Pakistan sees in Afghanistan and try and change the lens 
from seeing the Afghanistan conflict through a lens that thwarts India to a lens that a 
secure Afghanistan will benefit all three South Asian countries in the long run. In the 
short run Pakistan has little it can offer Afghanistan in the form of trade nor has it 
demonstrated that it is interested in helping the lives of the average Afghanistan citizen. 
This is evidence by the support Pakistan lends the Taliban and to stop the Taliban from 
making peace which Pakistan sees has a threat to its strategic interests in the region.120 
The U.S. has developed a vital stake in the South Asia region. It is a region that is 
filled with Islamic military, nuclear issues and needed economic reform and 
development.121  Settling the Kashmir dispute would relieve a tremendous amount of 
pressure in South Asia. If Kashmir is settled the Islamic militancy that is plaguing the 
Kashmir conflict can stabilize. Pakistan will be in a better position to dry up support of 
terrorist safe havens and lend support to building a functioning Afghanistan. Concerns of 
nuclear proliferation are substantially reduced as Kashmir is no longer the flash point 
causing India and Pakistan to clash. Finally the region can become more integrated in the 
national economy. Removing the Kashmir conflict puts the region on the road to 
economic recovery and social stability. If the region ever becomes stable American 
businesses would be able to invest and build business interests.  At the end of the day 
trade makes everyone better off. 
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The execution of offensive realism has created an enormous amount of stress and 
conflict in the South Asia region. The regional stake holders have poured large amounts 
of resources in managing this foreign policy strategy. This strategy has resulted in periods 
of instability and strife in the Kashmir region. The uses of terrorism and the development 
of terrorist safe havens to have negatively impacted all the stake holders. India and 
Pakistan strain their resources in checking and counter checking each other. Then the 
biggest problem for the U.S. is its inability to produce a secure and stable Afghanistan 
because realism forces in play naturally counter U.S. strategic goals.  
As the U.S. prepares for a withdrawal in Afghanistan there is potential for a 
security void in the region. India is a country that has the resources to provide regional 
stability in the region and check the growth of Chinese power. However, a significant 
portion of Indian resources is tied up in an offensive realism struggle against Pakistan. 
The security competition between India and Pakistan spills into Afghanistan as both sides 
try to wield power over the other. Each side is trying to gain an upper hand of influence 
in Afghanistan either by keeping it open for proxy solider training grounds in the case of 
Pakistan or building trade and infrastructure in the case of India. 
A significant part of this realism play is trying to answer the question of what will 
be the final status of Kashmir. Both sides have invested heavily in maintaining a claim 
since 1947. The conflict will continue until the key actors to include the Kashmir’s pave a 
path to the future that will solve the problem. Only by finding a final status on Kashmir 
with South Asia be able to achieve a real, lasting peace. 
If peace is achieved the impacts to the region would be a long-term victory for all 
stake holders. The Kashmiris would be confident that after decades of war and strife they 
can finally live in peace with their families. Pakistan and India can then redeploy national 
assets to other more pressing concerns. The stress along the India / Pakistan border would 
experience substantial relief. The stability of Afghanistan would increase, as both India 
and Pakistan would start working together and harnessing returns on valuable resource 
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trade. The U.S. would gain a bigger strategic partner in India. As India is able to redeploy 
assets they will have a greater ability to participate in the security of the Indian Ocean 
through anti-piracy patrols and serve in a more effective capacity in checking the growth 
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